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NO DIRECTION HOME: CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS ON WASHINGTON’S HOMELESS
ENCAMPMENT ORDINANCES
Jordan Talge
Abstract: The Washington State Constitution protects the free exercise of religion. It also
vests strong police power in local governments. When these two constitutional provisions
conflict, the Washington State Supreme Court must draw the line between valid police power
action and impermissible burden on free exercise. In City of Woodinville v. Northshore
United Church of Christ,1 a municipal government crossed that line. The City of
Woodinville, Washington refused to consider a church’s application to host a homeless
encampment. The Court held this outright refusal to be an unjustified infringement on the
church’s free exercise of religion. The Court did not, however, articulate permissible steps a
municipality could take to regulate homeless encampments on church property. Absent
further guidance on the appropriate reach of homeless encampment ordinances, religious
organizations and municipalities lack clarity in hosting and regulating these sites. More than
a dozen municipalities in Washington have taken action to regulate temporary homeless
2
encampments, and legal challenges surrounding these encampments are likely to persist.
This Comment applies the Washington State Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny test to
municipal homeless encampment regulations, distinguishing valid exercises of police power
from undue restrictions on religious free exercise.

INTRODUCTION
As homelessness continues to plague cities across the United States,3
advocacy groups have implemented numerous strategies to address the
unfortunate consequences. One such effort has been the organization and
erection of temporary homeless encampments or “tent cities,” several of

1. 166 Wash. 2d 633, 211 P.3d 406 (2009).
2. See, e.g., Mercer Island Citizens for Fair Process v. Tent City 4, 156 Wash. App. 393, 400, 232
P.3d 1163, 1167 (2010). This is the most recent Washington appellate case involving homeless
encampments. Though the court decided the case on statutory grounds not implicating constitutional
protections of municipal police power or religious free exercise, the case demonstrates the
likelihood that legal challenges to homeless encampments will continue. See Act of March 23, 2010,
ch. 175, 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 1092 (acknowledging litigation between municipalities and
religious organizations over homeless encampments).
3. See DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 2009 ANNUAL HOMELESSNESS ASSESSMENT REPORT TO
CONGRESS, at i (2010), available at http://www.hudhre.info/documents/5thHomelessAssessment
Report.pdf (“On a single night in January 2009, there were an estimated 643,067 sheltered and
unsheltered homeless people nationwide.”). This report estimates that up to 37% of these homeless
persons were “unsheltered or on the ‘street.’” Id.
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which have been located in Washington State.4 Religious
organizations―claiming a mandate to aid the homeless5―often host
temporary encampments on their property.6 Cities and municipalities
typically subject these religious organizations and the encampments they
host to specific regulations as conditions for approval.7
In regulating homeless encampments, municipalities exercise the
inherent police power of all local governments.8 This municipal police
power is expressly authorized by article XI of the Washington State
Constitution, allowing “[a]ny county, city, town or township [to] make
and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other
regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.”9 The Washington
State Supreme Court has interpreted this provision broadly,10 upholding
municipal regulations that have a direct bearing on public health or
4. See Young Chang, New Tent City Revisits Issues Seattle Faced, SEATTLE TIMES, July 6, 2004,
at B1 (reporting that tent cities have been hosted in Burien, Tukwila, and Shoreline, Wash.); Sonia
Krishnan, Issaquah Church May Host Tent City in August, SEATTLE TIMES, May 12, 2007, at B3;
Don Mann, Smooth Sailing for Church and Tent City 4, but Not All Are Happy, WOODINVILLE
WEEKLY, Aug. 2, 2010, http://www.nwnews.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=1747:smooth-sailing-for-church-and-tent-city-4-but-not-all-are-happy&catid=34:news&
Itemid=72 (referencing a homeless encampment in Woodinville, Wash.); Rachel Pritchett, What
Tent Cities Are Really Like, KITSAP SUN, Aug. 7, 2010, at A1 (referencing a homeless encampment
in Olympia, WA and a proposed homeless encampment on the Kitsap Peninsula); Amy Roe, Mercer
Island May Host Tent City, SEATTLE TIMES, June 15, 2007, at B1.
5. See, e.g., Nicole Tsong, Clergy Disputes Mercer Island’s Tent City Rules, SEATTLE TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2010, at B1 (quoting Michael Ramos, Executive Director of the Greater Church Council of
Seattle, as stating that hosting a homeless encampment furthers “a fundamental religious duty to
shelter those who are homeless and feed those who are hungry”); see also City of Woodinville v.
Northshore United Church of Christ, 166 Wash. 2d 633, 642, 211 P.3d 406, 410 (2009) (noting that
the City of Woodinville “conceded . . . the Church’s sincerity of belief” in hosting a homeless
encampment as a religious requirement).
6. See, e.g., Will Mari, Another U District Church Agrees to Host Nickelsville Encampment,
SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 1, 2008, at B1 (referencing a homeless encampment in a church parking lot
near the University of Washington in Seattle, Wash.).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 33–35, 53–56 (outlining the health and safety regulations
included in municipal homeless encampment ordinances).
8. Hugh D. Spitzer, Municipal Police Power in Washington State, 75 WASH. L. REV. 495, 497
(2000) (describing traditional concepts of police power as including the “general governance of the
community” (citing ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS § 2, at 2 (1904))).
9. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11.
10. See Spitzer, supra note 8, at 495 (explaining that municipalities in Washington have enjoyed
“strong regulatory powers” under the state constitution’s police power provision); see also Justice
Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of Property Absolutism and Modern Government: The Interaction of
Police Power and Property Rights, 75 WASH. L. REV. 857, 880 (2000) (explaining that early police
power cases in Washington demonstrated that “‘[t]he legislature is itself primarily the judge of how
far police restrictions shall go.’” (quoting State v. Nichols, 28 Wash. 628, 632, 69 P. 372, 373
(1902))).
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safety.11 The Court has affirmed municipal police power actions
regulating sewage treatment, clean water, waste disposal, fire safety, and
weapon possession, as well as aesthetic regulations aimed at mitigating
specific threats to public health or safety.12 Most municipal homeless
encampment ordinances include similar regulations,13 and Washington
courts are likely to uphold these measures as applied to secular actors.14
As applied to religious organizations, however, homeless
encampment regulations implicate the Washington State Constitution’s
“absolute” protection of religious freedom.15 To maintain this strong
protection, Washington courts analyze all government actions affecting a
party’s religious exercise under “strict scrutiny.”16 Under the strict
scrutiny standard, the reviewing court conducts three distinct analyses of
the government action in question. First, the court decides whether the
government action actually burdens the free exercise of religion.17
Second, the court decides whether a compelling state interest justifies
the government’s burden on free exercise.18 Third, the court decides
whether the government’s action is the least restrictive means of
achieving its compelling interest.19

11. See Spitzer, supra note 8, at 500 (noting that the Washington State Supreme Court has
historically upheld “ordinances protecting the physical health and safety of citizens”).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 24–29.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 33–35, 53–56 (outlining the health and safety regulations
included in municipal homeless encampment ordinances).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 24–29.
15. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
16. See, e.g., First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 218, 840
P.2d 174, 183 (1992) (stating that the Washington State Supreme Court will subject any
infringement on religious free exercise to strict scrutiny); see also infra text accompanying note 102
(explaining the Washington State Supreme Court’s reliance on the strict scrutiny test).
17. See, e.g., First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 226, 840 P.2d at 187 (explaining that government
action can be upheld if it does not burden religious free exercise under the first prong of the strict
scrutiny test); see also infra text accompanying notes 106–130 (describing the Washington State
Supreme Court’s burden analysis).
18. See, e.g., First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 226, 840 P.2d at 187 (“State action is constitutional
under the free exercise clause of article 1 if the action results in no infringement of a citizen’s right
or if a compelling state interest justifies any burden on the free exercise of religion.” (citing Witters
v. State Comm’n for the Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 371, 771 P.2d 1119, 1123 (1989); City of
Sumner v. First Baptist Church of Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 7–8, 639 P.2d 1358, 1362 (1982))); see
also infra text accompanying notes 131–138 (explaining the Washington State Supreme Court’s
requirement for finding a compelling government interest).
19. See, e.g., First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 227, 840 P.2d at 187 (“The State also must
demonstrate that the means chosen to achieve its compelling interest are necessary and the least
restrictive available.” (citing Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d at 8, 15, 639 P.2d at 1366 (Utter, J., concurring);
State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860, 864, 239 P.2d 545, 548 (1952))); see also
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This Comment applies the strict scrutiny test to municipal homeless
encampment regulations in Washington. Part I reviews the Washington
State Supreme Court’s police power jurisprudence, demonstrating the
Court’s willingness to uphold measures designed to protect public health
and safety. Part II analyzes the Court’s treatment of the state
constitution’s free exercise clause, outlining the difficulty municipal
governments face in surviving the Court’s strict scrutiny test.
Finally, Part III applies the Washington State Supreme Court’s threepronged strict scrutiny test to municipal homeless encampment
regulations. Under the first prong of the strict scrutiny test, all homeless
encampment regulations burden religious free exercise. Under the
second prong, however, many of these regulations serve a compelling
government interest in protecting public health and safety. Such
measures include sanitation, clean water, and security mandates.
Nevertheless, even if homeless encampment regulations serve a
compelling health and safety interest, they must be the least restrictive
means of achieving that interest under the third prong of the strict
scrutiny test. This Comment argues that uniform caps on the number of
residents a homeless encampment may host and blanket restrictions on
the length of time an encampment may remain at a particular site are not
the least restrictive means of protecting public health and safety and are
therefore invalid impositions on religious free exercise.
I.

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MAY PROTECT PUBLIC
HEALTH AND SAFETY UNDER THEIR INHERENT POLICE
POWER

More than a dozen municipalities in Washington currently regulate
homeless encampments within their jurisdictions.20 Each of these
infra text accompanying notes 139–145 (describing the Washington State Supreme Court’s least
restrictive means requirement).
20. At least thirteen municipalities in Washington have taken action to regulate homeless
encampments. Municipalities have approved city ordinances, updates to municipal zoning codes,
conditional use permits, and consent decrees regulating these encampments. This Comment uses
“regulations” and “ordinances” as generic terms to refer to these kinds of municipal actions. See
Auburn, Wash., Ordinance 6014 (May 2, 2006) [hereinafter Auburn]; BOTHELL, WASH., MUN.
CODE § 12.06.160 (2010) [hereinafter BOTHELL], http://www.codepublishing.com/wa/bothell;
Burien, Wash., Temporary Use Permit BUR 02-0979-LU-A (Nov. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Burien];
Issaquah, Wash., Special Event/Use Permit SPE07-00032 (June 11, 2007) [hereinafter Issaquah];
KIRKLAND, WASH., ZONING CODE § 127.05–.45 (2010) [hereinafter KIRKLAND],
http://kirklandcode.ecitygov.net/CK_KMC_Search.html; LYNNWOOD, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 21.74.010–.070 (2010)
[hereinafter
LYNNWOOD],
http://www.mrsc.org/mc/lynnwood/
Lynnwood21/lynnwood2174.html; Mercer Island, Wash., Ordinance 10C-01 (Feb. 1, 2010)
[hereinafter Mercer Island]; OLYMPIA, WASH., MUN. CODE § 18.50.000–.060 (2010) [hereinafter
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regulations is based on police power authority vested in municipal
governments, a power that has been described as “the inherent power of
the community to regulate activities for the protection of public health
and safety.”21
In Washington, article XI of the state constitution governs the police
power, authorizing “[a]ny county, city, town or township [to] make and
enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other
regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.”22 The Washington
State Supreme Court has recognized the broad municipal authority
afforded by this constitutional provision.23 The Court has consistently
upheld government action directly affecting public health, including
ordinances governing sewage treatment,24 clean water,25 and solid waste
disposal.26 The Court has also regularly upheld government efforts to
protect public safety and security, including ordinances governing fire
safety27 and restrictions on weapon possession.28 In cases where the
government’s action only indirectly affects health and safety, such as
ordinances regulating outdoor aesthetics, the Court has required that the
government action further a health and safety purpose to constitute a
valid exercise of the police power.29

OLYMPIA], http://www.codepublishing.com/wa/olympia/; SEATAC, WASH., MUN. CODE § 15.20.045
(2010) [hereinafter SEATAC], http://www.codepublishing.com/wa/seatac/; Seattle, Wash., Consent
Decree in SHARE/WHEEL v. City of Seattle, 49428-7-I (Mar. 13, 2002) [hereinafter Seattle Decree];
Shoreline, Wash., Administrative Order 301138-A (Apr. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Shoreline];
SPOKANE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 10.08C (2010) [hereinafter SPOKANE], http://www.
spokanecity.org/services/documents/smc/default.aspx; Woodinville, Wash., Ordinance 369 (Aug.
10, 2004) [hereinafter Woodinville].
21. See Spitzer, supra note 8, at 497.
22. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11.
23. See Spitzer, supra note 8, at 497.
24. Morse v. Wise, 37 Wash. 2d 806, 810–11, 226 P.2d 214, 216 (1951); Elliot v. City of
Leavenworth, 197 Wash. 427, 435–36, 85 P.2d 1053, 1056–57 (1938).
25. Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 Wash. 2d 616, 620, 277 P.2d 352, 354 (1955).
26. City of Spokane v. Carlson, 73 Wash. 2d 76, 79, 436 P.2d 454, 456 (1968); Cornelius v. City
of Seattle. 123 Wash. 550, 559, 213 P. 17, 21 (1923).
27. Haas v. City of Kirkland, 78 Wash. 2d 929, 932, 481 P.2d 9, 11 (1971); Coffin v. Blackwell,
116 Wash. 281, 287, 199 P. 239, 241–42 (1921); City of Seattle v. Hinckley, 40 Wash. 468, 470–71,
82 P. 747, 748 (1905).
28. City of Seattle v. Montana, 129 Wash. 2d 583, 595, 919 P.2d 1218, 1225 (1996); State v.
Krantz, 24 Wash. 2d 350, 353, 164 P.2d 453, 454 (1945).
29. Ackerly Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 92 Wash. 2d 905, 920, 602 P.2d 1177, 1186–87
(1979); Markham Adver. Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 424, 439 P.2d 248, 260 (1968); Lenci v.
City of Seattle, 63 Wash. 2d 664, 676, 388 P.2d 926, 934 (1964).
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Municipal Governments May Take Action Necessary to Protect
Public Health

The Washington State Supreme Court has upheld municipal police
power laws protecting public health.30 As the Court announced in State
v. Boren,31 “[t]he state, under its police power, has the right, and it is its
duty, to protect its people . . . . This is especially true as to the health of
the people, which affects every man, woman and child within the
state.”32 Homeless encampment regulations in Washington almost
uniformly include provisions designed to protect public health.
Homeless encampment regulations in Washington require effective
sewage treatment,33 adequate clean water,34 and regular trash
collection.35 Recognizing municipal authority to protect public health,
30. See Spitzer, supra note 8, at 500 (noting that the Washington State Supreme Court has
historically upheld “ordinances protecting the physical health and safety of citizens”).
31. 36 Wash. 2d 522, 219 P.2d 560 (1950).
32. Id. at 525, 219 P.2d at 568.
33. See, e.g., Auburn, supra note 20, at 4 (requiring host to accommodate “sanitary portable
toilets in the number required to meet capacity guidelines”); BOTHELL, supra note 20,
§ 12.06.160(B)(3)(d)(4) (“Adequate toilet facilities shall be provided on-site.”); Burien, supra note
20, at 2 (requiring host to include “sanitation facilities”); KIRKLAND, supra note 20, § 127.25(2)(l)
(requiring host to comply with human waste regulations); LYNNWOOD, supra note
20, § 21.74.030(K) (requiring host to provide “sanitary portable toilets”); Mercer Island, supra note
20, at 4 (requiring host to comply with human waste regulations); SEATAC, supra note
20, § 15.20.045(B)(2) (requiring host to provide sanitary portable toilets); SPOKANE, supra note
20, § 10.08C.120(H) (requiring host to provide “[o]ne sanitary portable toilet per twenty persons onsite”).
34. See, e.g., Auburn, supra note 20, at 4 (requiring host to provide “hand washing stations by the
toilet and by the food areas” of the encampment and also to “provide an adequate water source to
the Homeless Encampment”); BOTHELL, supra note 20, § 12.06.160(B)(3)(d)(4) (“[An] adequate
supply of potable water shall be available on-site at all times.”); Burien, supra note 20, at 2
(requiring host to provide “hot water for sanitation purposes”); KIRKLAND, supra note
20, § 127.25(2)(l) (requiring host to comply with drinking water regulations); LYNNWOOD, supra
note 20, § 21.74.030(K) (requiring host to provide “[h]and-washing stations by the toilets and food
preparation areas”); Mercer Island, supra note 20, at 4 (requiring host to comply with drinking water
standards); SEATAC, supra note 20, § 15.20.045(B)(2) (requiring host to provide hand washing
stations and an adequate water source to the encampment); SPOKANE, supra note
20, § 10.08C.120(H) (requiring host to provide hand washing stations by the toilets and food areas,
and to provide showers and an adequate water source).
35. See, e.g., Auburn, supra note 20, at 4 (requiring host to provide adequate number of “refuse
receptacles”); BOTHELL, supra note 20, § 12.06.160(B)(3)(d)(5) (“Adequate facilities for dealing
with trash shall be provided on-site.”); KIRKLAND, supra note 20, § 127.25(2)(l) (requiring host to
comply with solid waste disposal regulations); LYNNWOOD, supra note 20, § 21.74.030(N)
(“Facilities for dealing with trash shall be provided on-site.”); Mercer Island, supra note 20, at 4
(requiring host to comply with solid waste disposal regulations); Seattle Decree, supra note 20, at 6
(requiring trash patrol in the host site neighborhood); SEATAC, supra note 20, § 15.20.045(B)(2)
(requiring host to provide adequate refuse receptacles); SPOKANE, supra note 20, § 10.08C.120(N),
(requiring host to provide refuse containers and remove solid waste from the site).
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the Washington State Supreme Court has upheld municipal regulations
mandating sewage treatment,36 clean water,37 and waste cleanup38 in
previous police power cases.
The Washington State Supreme Court has long recognized municipal
authority to mandate sewage and sewer services.39 In Elliot v. City of
Leavenworth,40 the Court held that the public health threat posed by raw
sewage justified an ordinance creating a new sewage system and its
financing scheme.41 The Court affirmed the validity of sewage
regulations in Morse v. Wise.42 In Morse, the Court held that when a city
regulates sewage, it “acts pursuant to the police power granted to it to
provide sewer service to protect the health of its inhabitants.”43
The Court has also upheld local drinking water regulations as valid
exercises of municipal police power.44 In Kaul v. City of Chehalis,45 the
Court held it was “the duty of the city to furnish [residents] with
wholesome water, free from contamination.”46 Because of this municipal
public health duty, the city’s drinking water regulation “violate[d] none
of [the public’s] constitution[al] rights.”47
Sanitation regulations, including garbage cleanup and collection
ordinances, are also constitutional exercises of municipal police power.
The Washington State Supreme Court has held that regulation of
“noxious, unwholesome substances” directly promotes public health,
therefore falling within the police power of the municipality.48 In one
particular case, the Court upheld a sanitation ordinance despite evidence
that the ordinance itself was enacted to satisfy questionable legislative
motives.49 The Court has even upheld a municipal ordinance requiring
36. Morse v. Wise, 37 Wash. 2d 806, 810–11, 226 P.2d 214, 216 (1951); Elliot v. City of
Leavenworth, 197 Wash. 427, 431, 85 P.2d 1053, 1054–55 (1938).
37. Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 Wash. 2d 616, 620, 277 P.2d 352, 354 (1955).
38. City of Spokane v. Carlson, 73 Wash. 2d 76, 79, 436 P.2d 454, 456 (1968); Cornelius v. City
of Seattle. 123 Wash. 550, 559, 213 P. 17, 21 (1923).
39. Elliot, 197 Wash. at 431, 85 P.2d at 1054–55.
40. 197 Wash. 427, 85 P.2d 1053 (1938).
41. Id. at 431, 85 P.2d at 1054–55.
42. 37 Wash. 2d 806, 226 P.2d 214 (1951).
43. Id. at 810–11, 226 P.2d at 216.
44. Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 Wash. 2d 616, 621, 277 P.2d 352, 355 (1955).
45. 45 Wash. 2d 616, 620, 277 P.2d 352, 354 (1955).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. City of Spokane v. Carlson, 73 Wash. 2d 76, 79, 436 P.2d 454, 456 (1968) (quoting Smith v.
City of Spokane, 55 Wash. 219, 221, 104 P. 249, 250 (1909)).
49. Cornelius v. City of Seattle, 123 Wash. 550, 559, 213 P. 17, 21 (1923) (affirming the power
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disposal of non-threatening cardboard,50 further demonstrating the strong
municipal police power to regulate sanitation.
B.

Municipal Governments May Enact Measures to Protect Public
Safety

In addition to broad authority to protect public health, municipalities
may protect public safety under their constitutional police power.51 This
ability to maintain “the safety of the community” is a “universally
recognized right of the community in all civilized governments” and
falls squarely within the police power.52 Homeless encampment
regulations in Washington include many provisions designed to protect
public safety.
Most municipal homeless encampment ordinances include public
safety provisions mandating fire safety,53 restrictions on weapons,54 and
of the City of Seattle to enact a law requiring food waste from city restaurants and hotels to be
collected by a city contractor despite strong evidence that the ordinance was adopted not as a public
health measure but as a means of discouraging Japanese hog farmers who relied on the food waste
for feed).
50. Carlson, 73 Wash. 2d at 80–81, 436 P.2d at 457 (“The mere fact that the particular refuse
picked up and disposed of by the defendant may not have been injurious to the public health does
not mean that the city could not reasonably decide that the control of the disposition of such
materials was necessary for the protection of the public health and sanitation.”).
51. See Spitzer, supra note 8, at 500 (noting that the Washington State Supreme Court has
historically upheld “ordinances protecting the physical health and safety of citizens”).
52. City of Seattle v. Hinckley, 40 Wash. 468, 471, 82 P. 747, 748 (1905).
53. See, e.g., Auburn, supra note 20, at 6–7 (requiring that tents be made of “fire-retardant
material,” prohibiting open fires, and requiring fire extinguishers and proper electrical cords);
BOTHELL, supra note 20, § 12.06.160(B)(3)(d)(2) (subjecting homeless encampments to review by
fire marshal for proper spacing of tents at any time); Burien, supra note 20, at 2 (requiring that tents
be made of flame-retardant material, prohibiting open flames and smoking, and requiring adequate
electrical cords); Issaquah, supra note 20, at 2 (requiring that tents be made of flame-retardant
material, and prohibiting open flames and smoking); KIRKLAND, supra note 20, § 127.25(2)(k)(4)
(prohibiting open flames in encampment); Mercer Island, supra note 20, at 4 (requiring that flameretardant materials be used, and prohibiting open flames); SEATAC, supra note
20, § 15.20.045(E)(2) (requiring that tent materials be flame-retardant, prohibiting open flames, and
requiring fire extinguishers and proper electrical equipment); SPOKANE, supra note
20, §§ 10.08C.120(N), 10.08C.140(B) (requiring that host site provide fire extinguishers, mandating
that tent materials be flame-retardant, and prohibiting open fires).
54. See, e.g., Auburn, supra note 20, at 5–6 (requiring that host agency provide “Operations and
Security Plan” and enforce a code of conduct that prohibits weapons, drugs, and alcohol); BOTHELL,
supra note 20, § 12.06.160(B)(3)(e)(3)(F) (stating that host “shall provide on-site security” for the
encampment); KIRKLAND, supra note 20, § 127.25(2)(k) (requiring host site to enforce code of
conduct prohibiting weapons, drugs and alcohol, and violence); Mercer Island, supra note 20, at 4
(requiring host to enforce code of conduct prohibiting drugs and alcohol, violence, and weapons,
including knives over three-and-a-half inches in length); SEATAC, supra note 20, § 15.20.045(C)
(requiring host site to provide security plan and enforce code of conduct prohibiting drugs and
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prohibitions against sex offenders residing in homeless encampments.55
The ordinances also include aesthetic requirements to screen homeless
encampments from neighboring properties.56 Recognizing the rights of
local governments to protect public safety, the Washington State
Supreme Court has consistently upheld municipal ordinances mandating
fire safety,57 and has also recognized the right of local governments to
place reasonable restrictions on weapon possession.58 The Washington
State Supreme Court has not had occasion to rule on the constitutionality
of sex offender residency restrictions, but other courts have generally
found such ordinances to fall within the police power.59 Finally, the
alcohol, violence, and weapons); Seattle Decree, supra note 20, at 6 (requiring enforcement of
homeless encampment code of conduct prohibiting drugs and alcohol, violence, and weapons,
including knives over three-and-a-half inches in length); SPOKANE, supra note 20, § 10.08C.120(P)
(requiring host site to have “operations and security plan” to prohibit drugs and alcohol, disorderly
conduct, and weapons).
55. See, e.g., Auburn, supra note 20, at 6 (mandating that host obtain a sex offender check from
the local sheriff or police department and reject any resident who is a registered sex offender);
BOTHELL, supra note 20, § 12.06.160(B)(3)(e)(3) (mandating that host obtain a sex offender check
from the local sheriff or police department and reject any resident who is a registered sex offender);
KIRKLAND, supra note 20, § 127.25(2)(m) (requiring host to obtain sex offender checks and comply
with police reporting based on results of those checks); LYNNWOOD, supra note
20, §§ 21.74.030(O)–(P) (requiring host to obtain sex offender check and reject any registered sex
offender from homeless encampments); Mercer Island, supra note 20, at 4 (“No convicted sex
offender shall reside in the temporary encampment.”); SEATAC, supra note 20, § 15.20.045(C)
(requiring host site to obtain sex offender checks and reject any resident who is a registered sex
offender); SPOKANE, supra note 20, § 10.08C.120(P) (requiring host site to prohibit sex offenders
from entering encampments).
56. See, e.g., Auburn, supra note 20, at 5 (requiring that homeless encampments be “adequately
buffered and screened” with “fencing [or] landscaping” at “a minimum height of six (6) feet”);
BOTHELL, supra note 20, § 12.06.160(B)(3)(b)(3) (requiring that homeless encampments be
screened from adjacent properties by “a minimum six-foot-high temporary fence, an existing fence,
existing dense vegetation, [or] an existing topographic difference”); KIRKLAND, supra note
20, § 127.25(2)(m) (requiring “sight obscuring fencing” around encampments); LYNNWOOD, supra
note 20, § 21.74.030(C) (“A six-foot-tall sight-obscuring fencing is required around the perimeter of
the encampment”); Mercer Island, supra note 20, at 3 (requiring a “six-foot high sight obscuring
fence” or other vegetation or landscaping to “provide a privacy and visual buffering among
neighboring properties”); SEATAC, supra note 20, § 15.20.045(B)(9) (requiring that encampments
be “adequately buffered and screened” by fencing or landscaping at least six feet in height); Seattle
Decree, supra note 20, at 5 (requiring a buffer of “established vegetation sufficiently dense to
obscure view and at least eight feet in height” or “an eight-foot high, view-obscuring fabric fence”).
57. Haas v. City of Kirkland, 78 Wash. 2d 929, 932, 481 P.2d 9, 11 (1971); Coffin v. Blackwell,
116 Wash. 281, 287, 199 P. 239, 241–42 (1921); Hinckley, 40 Wash. at 470–71, 82 P. at 748.
58. City of Seattle v. Montana, 129 Wash. 2d 583, 595, 919 P.2d 1218, 1225 (1996); State v.
Krantz, 24 Wash. 2d 350, 353, 164 P.2d 453, 454 (1945).
59. See, e.g., Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep’t, 453 F.3d 1010, 1016–20 (8th Cir. 2006)
(holding that Arkansas law barring sex offenders from living near schools was not an
unconstitutional ex post facto law, did not violate substantive due process, did not violate equal
protection, and did not violate constitutional right to intrastate travel); see also infra text
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Washington State Supreme Court has approved regulations of outdoor
aesthetics, but only when those regulations are designed to promote
public safety.60
The Washington State Supreme Court has long upheld the right of
municipalities to enforce fire safety and fire hazard regulations.61 In a
decision announced shortly after Washington attained statehood, the
Court held that “[t]here can be no doubt as to the constitutionality” of a
Seattle ordinance designed “to protect persons from fire.”62 The Court
has since affirmed that “[i]t is well settled that the enactment of
reasonable ordinances regarding the protection of the lives and safety of
persons, as well as the protection of property against fire, is within the
police power of a municipality.”63 The Court has also upheld
enforcement of fire ordinances through fines and possible criminal
sanctions as a valid exercise of the police power.64
In addition to fire safety provisions, most homeless encampment
ordinances require hosts to keep their encampment free of weapons.65
The Washington State Supreme Court has upheld municipal regulations
of weapon possession.66 Washington courts have approved limitations on
pistol ownership for violent criminal convicts,67 bans on weapons in
penal institutions,68 restrictions on guns where alcohol is served,69 and
prohibitions against carrying guns that alarm or frighten other persons.70

accompanying notes 73–78 (describing sex offender registry restrictions in Washington and the
treatment of similar restrictions in other jurisdictions).
60. See Ackerly Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 92 Wash. 2d 905, 920, 602 P.2d 1177, 1186–
87 (1979); Markham Adver. Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 424, 439 P.2d 248, 260 (1968); Lenci v.
City of Seattle, 63 Wash. 2d 664, 676, 388 P.2d 926, 934 (1964).
61. See Coffin, 116 Wash. at 287, 199 P. at 240–41; Hinckley, 40 Wash. at 470–71, 82 P. at 748.
62. Hinckley, 40 Wash. at 470–71, 82 P. at 748.
63. Haas v. City of Kirkland, 78 Wash. 2d 929, 932, 481 P.2d 9, 11 (1971).
64. City of Everett v. Unsworth, 54 Wash. 2d 760, 764, 344 P.2d 728, 730–31 (1959).
65. See, e.g., Mercer Island, supra note 20, at 4 (requiring host to enforce code of conduct
prohibiting drugs and alcohol, violence, and weapons, including knives over three-and-a-half inches
in length); see also supra text accompanying note 54 (describing homeless encampment weapons
restrictions).
66. See City of Seattle v. Montana, 129 Wash. 2d 583, 595, 919 P.2d 1218, 1225 (1996); State v.
Krantz, 24 Wash. 2d 350, 353, 164 P.2d 453, 454 (1945).
67. State v. Tully, 198 Wash. 605, 607, 89 P.2d 517, 518 (1939).
68. State v. Barnes, 42 Wash. App. 56, 58, 708 P.2d 414, 415 (1985).
69. Second Amendment Found. v. City of Renton, 35 Wash. App. 583, 587, 668 P.2d 596, 598
(1983).
70. State v. Spencer, 75 Wash. App. 118, 124, 876 P.2d 939, 942 (1994).
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The Court has even upheld municipal restrictions on “ordinary” fixedblade knives to protect public safety.71
Unlike fire safety and weapons ordinances, the constitutionality of sex
offender laws has not been tested in Washington State.72 The
Washington State Legislature has passed laws mandating that criminals
convicted of sex crimes register with appropriate law enforcement
agencies,73 and that law enforcement agencies release sex offender
information to the public.74 Washington has placed residency restrictions
on some classes of sex offenders.75 Sex offenders convicted of sex
crimes involving minors are not allowed to live within “community
protection zone[s],”76 defined as areas within “eight hundred eighty feet
of the facilities and grounds of a public or private school.”77 To date, no
constitutional challenge to these statutes has been brought before a
Washington appellate court. Courts in other jurisdictions have upheld
sex offender residency restrictions based on the government’s
compelling interest in protecting children.78
71. Montana, 129 Wash. 2d at 590, 919 P.2d at 122.
72. Washington appellate courts have not addressed the legality of the state’s sex offender laws.
The constitutionality of sex offender laws falls outside the scope of this Comment.
73. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130 (2008).
74. Id. §§ 72.09.345, 4.24.550 (2008).
75. Id. § 9.94A.703 (2008) (prohibiting sex offenders convicted of child sex crimes from living
within “community protection zones”).
76. Id.
77. Id. § 9.94A.030(8) (2008).
78. See Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep’t, 453 F.3d 1010,1016–20 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that
Arkansas law barring sex offenders from living near schools was not an unconstitutional ex post
facto law, did not violate substantive due process, did not violate equal protection, and did not
violate constitutional right to intrastate travel); Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 708–22 (8th Cir. 2005)
(holding that Iowa law preventing sex offenders from living within 2,000 feet of a school did not
violate substantive or procedural due process, did not abridge any constitutional right to travel, did
not violate the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination, and was not an ex post
facto law); Doe v. Baker, No. Civ.A. 1:05-CV-2265, 2006 WL 905368, *2–9 (N.D.Ga. Apr. 5,
2006) (holding that Georgia state law prohibiting sex offenders from living within 1,000 feet of
school or childcare facility was not an ex post facto law, did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, did not violate substantive or procedural due process,
and did not result in a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment); People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769,
776–77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that Illinois statute prohibiting sex offenders from living within
500 feet of schools was reasonably related to the government’s compelling interest in protecting
children from known sex offenders). Although the Washington State Supreme Court has not ruled
on the validity of sex offender residency restrictions, it has recognized a compelling interest in state
protection of children in other contexts. See State v. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 735, 738, 612 P.2d 795,
797 (1980) (upholding paternity test law because “the interest of the State in the welfare of its minor
children has long been a compelling and paramount concern.” (citing Heney v. Heney, 24 Wash. 2d
445, 165 P.2d 864 (1946); State v. Coffey, 77 Wash. 2d 630, 465 P.2d 665 (1970); State v. Bowen,
80 Wash. 2d 808, 498 P.2d 877 (1972); State v. Wood, 89 Wash. 2d 97, 569 P.2d 1148 (1977))); see
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In addition to fire safety ordinances, weapons restrictions, and
prohibitions on sex offenders, most municipal homeless encampment
ordinances regulate the aesthetic impact of encampments.79 The
Washington State Supreme Court has upheld aesthetic regulations when
enacted for a public safety purpose.80 The Court first addressed a
challenge to a municipal regulation of outdoor aesthetics in Lenci v. City
of Seattle.81 In Lenci, the Court considered the validity of a Seattle city
ordinance requiring the premises of a motor vehicle wrecker to be
“enclosed by a view obscuring, firm and substantial fence or a solid
wall, at least eight (8) feet high.”82 The plaintiffs, owners of wreck yards
in the city, argued that the ordinance was based on aesthetic
considerations beyond the valid exercise of the police power.83 The
Court acknowledged that “[t]he basic rule . . . is that aesthetic conditions
alone will not support invocation of the police powers,” but held that if
the regulation protected public safety, “the fact that aesthetic
considerations play a part in its adoption does not affect its validity.”84
The Court reviewed legislative findings surrounding the screening
ordinance and testimony that the view-obstructing fence was needed to
lessen the “volume of thefts of parts of automobiles.”85 Because
“[m]inimizing crime, vandalism, and petty thievery is an objective well
within the recognized scope of municipal police power,” the Court
upheld the ordinance.86

also State v. Motherwell, 114 Wash. 2d 353, 365, 788 P.2d 1066, 1072 (1990) (upholding child
abuse reporting statute because “the State’s interest in the protection of children is unquestionably
of the utmost importance.”).
79. See supra text accompanying note 56; see also Shoreline, supra note 20, at 3–4. In 2002, the
City of Shoreline denied Shoreline Free Methodist Church’s application to host a homeless
encampment because of the project’s “appearance.” Officials from the city visited another homeless
encampment site, a visit that “confirmed that although clean and orderly, the appearance of the
encampment is visually incompatible with a low or medium density residential neighborhood.”
Only after reapplying with a plan for a “temporary screening fence” was the church able to host a
homeless encampment. Observing tents of “various materials and colors,” the City of Shoreline
agreed with a previous homeless encampment host that an encampment is “not a pleasant thing to
look at.”Id.
80. See Ackerly Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 92 Wash. 2d 905, 920, 602 P.2d 1177, 1186–
87 (1979); Markham Adver. Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 424, 439 P.2d 248, 260 (1968); Lenci v.
City of Seattle, 63 Wash. 2d 664, 676, 388 P.2d 926, 934 (1964).
81. 63 Wash. 2d 664, 388 P.2d 926 (1964).
82. Id. at 666, 388 P.2d at 928.
83. Id. at 676, 388 P.2d at 934.
84. Id. at 676–77, 388 P.2d at 934.
85. Id. at 673, 388 P.2d at 932.
86. Id. at 676, 388 P.2d at 934.
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Four years after Lenci, the Court employed similar reasoning to
uphold a state highway beautification measure in Markham Advertising
Co. v. State.87 In that case, several advertising companies challenged the
State’s Highway Advertising Control Act.88 The advertising companies,
like the auto-wreckers in Lenci, argued that the statute was based on
aesthetic considerations alone and was thus an invalid exercise of
municipal police power.89 The Court disagreed. As it did in Lenci, the
Court afforded broad deference to legislative findings that demonstrated
“a substantial relation between traffic safety and the regulation of
outdoor advertising.”90 Because traffic safety “is clearly a proper
purpose for the exercise of the police power,”91 the Court upheld the
statute.92
C.

The Washington State Supreme Court Has Not Addressed the
Validity of Maximum-Resident or Maximum-Duration Regulations

Municipal homeless encampment ordinances in Washington typically
limit the number of residents who can live in a proposed encampment.93
Most of the ordinances restrict all homeless encampments to 100
residents,94 irrespective of a host’s capacity to serve additional persons.
Most homeless encampment ordinances also include blanket limitations
87. 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968).
88. Id. at 408, 439 P.2d at 251.
89. Id. at 421, 439 P.2d at 258.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 424, 439 P.2d at 260.
93. See, e.g., Auburn, supra note 20, at 5, 6 (“[N]o more than 100 residents shall be allowed” at
any homeless encampment, and the maximum duration of any homeless encampment “shall be
ninety (90) days”); BOTHELL, supra note 20, § 12.06.160(B)(3)(c)(1) (“[U]nder no circumstances
shall a proposed transitory accommodation be allowed in one location for more than 90 days.”);
KIRKLAND, supra note 20, at 1 (“The maximum number of residents within a homeless encampment
is 100.”); LYNNWOOD, supra note 20, §§ 21.74.030(E), 21.74.040 (stating that the maximum
number of homeless encampment residents shall not “be greater than 100 people” and that
“[t]emporary tent encampments may be approved for a period not to exceed 90 days”); Mercer
Island, supra note 20, at 2 (“The encampment shall be limited to a maximum of 100 persons,” and
no encampment may operate for more than “90 consecutive days” in the same location); SEATAC,
supra note 20, § 15.20.045(B), (D) (“No more than one hundred (100) residents shall be allowed,”
and “[t]he duration of the homeless encampment shall not exceed ninety (90) days”); Seattle
Decree, supra note 20, at 5, 7 (“The maximum number of residents at an encampment is 100,” and
“the maximum duration of a SHARE/WHEEL tent encampment at a site is three (3) consecutive
months.”); SPOKANE, supra note 20, § 10.08C.120(A), (C) (“No more than one hundred residents
shall be allowed,” and “[t]he maximum continuous duration of a homeless encampment shall be
ninety days.”).
94. See, e.g., Auburn, supra note 20, at 5 (“[N]o more than 100 residents shall be allowed.”).
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on the time period an encampment may stay at one host site.95 No
homeless encampment is allowed to stay at one host site longer than
three consecutive months,96 regardless of the host’s capacity to maintain
the encampment for longer periods of time. Organizations are also
prohibited from hosting an encampment at the same site for more than
six months during a two-year period.97 Unlike the homeless encampment
provisions previously discussed, these maximum-resident and
maximum-duration restrictions lack analogous precedent in Washington
case law. The validity of these provisions, even as applied to secular
actors, is not as clear as the other health and safety provisions discussed
in this Comment.
II.

ONLY POLICE POWER ACTIONS PROTECTING PUBLIC
HEALTH AND SAFETY CAN JUSTIFY A BURDEN ON FREE
EXERCISE

The Washington State Constitution provides for “absolute freedom of
conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship.”98
Despite this “absolute” protection, however, Washington citizens may
not use religious freedom to “justify practices inconsistent with the
peace and safety of the state.”99 By including this important caveat, the
constitution protects religious freedom while also subjecting it to valid
police power regulations.100 Establishing a line between valid police
power action and unconstitutional infringement on free exercise has
required the Washington State Supreme Court to update its religious
freedom jurisprudence in the last two decades. Since 1992, the Court has
interpreted the state constitution to provide more protection for free
exercise than the federal constitution101 and has continued to review any
governmental interference with free exercise under strict scrutiny.102
95. See, e.g., LYNNWOOD, supra note 20, §§ 21.74.030(E), 21.74.040 (“Temporary tent
encampments may be approved for a period not to exceed 90 days.”).
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Mercer Island, supra note 20, at 2.
98. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
99. Id.
100. See City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 166 Wash. 2d 633, 642, 211
P.3d 406, 410 n.3 (2009) (explaining that the religious exercise protected by the Washington State
Constitution is not so broad as to prohibit the government from requiring “compliance with
reasonable police power regulation”); see also State v. Gohl, 46 Wash. 408, 410, 90 P. 259, 260
(1907) (“A constitutional guaranty of certain rights to the individual citizen does not place such
rights entirely beyond the police power of the state.”).
101. When assessing differences between the state and federal constitutions, the Washington
State Supreme Court applies a six-factor test to determine which constitution provides greater
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The Washington State Supreme Court Applies a Strict Scrutiny Test
to Government Actions that Affect Religious Free Exercise

Under the Washington State Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny test, the
Court conducts three distinct analyses of the government action in
question. First, the Court decides whether the government action
actually burdens the free exercise of religion.103 Second, the Court
decides whether a compelling state interest justifies the government’s
burden on free exercise.104 Third, the Court decides whether the
protection for certain activities. This six-factor test was announced in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.
2d. 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). The first time the Court applied the Gunwall factors to the free
exercise of religion was in First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203,
840 P.2d 174 (1992). The Court found that “[t]he language of our state constitution is significantly
different and stronger than the federal constitution.” Id. at 225, 840 P.2d at 186. The Court thus
distinguished its religious freedom jurisprudence from the U.S. Supreme Court’s more restrictive
view of free exercise expressed in its contemporaneous decision in Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990). Under the more protective standard announced in First Covenant, the
Washington State Supreme Court held, contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Smith, that
a “facially neutral, even-handedly enforced statute that does not directly burden free exercise may,
nonetheless, violate [the Washington State Constitution], if it indirectly burdens the exercise of
religion.” First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 226, 840 P.2d at 187. First Covenant thus created a
distinct religious freedom jurisprudence in Washington, insulated from federal religious freedom
cases and the federal legislative reaction to Smith. See Northshore United Church of Christ, 166
Wash. 2d 633, 645, 211 P.3d 406, 411 (2009) (explaining that the Washington constitution provides
greater protection for religious freedom, and “[s]ince we hold for the Church on state constitutional
grounds, we need not, and therefore do not, decide whether there is violation of [the federal
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)].”).
102. Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 199, 930 P.2d 318, 321 (1997) (“This Court applies a
strict scrutiny test to the analysis of religious exercise cases.”); First United Methodist Church of
Seattle v. Hearing Exam’r for the Seattle Landmarks Pres. Bd., 129 Wash. 2d. 238, 247, 916 P.2d
374, 378 (1996) (noting that the Washington State Supreme Court applies a strict scrutiny test);
First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 218, 840 P.2d at 183 (stating that the Washington State Supreme
Court will subject any infringement on free exercise to strict scrutiny). The elements of the strict
scrutiny test the Washington State Supreme Court employs are the same as those outlined by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Although the Washington State
Supreme Court did not determine that the Washington State Constitution provided greater
protection for religious free exercise than the U.S. Constitution until its decision in First Covenant
in 1992 (see supra text accompanying note 101), earlier Washington cases still provide guidance on
the application of the strict scrutiny test and will be discussed throughout this Comment.
103. Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 199, 930 P.2d at 321 (noting that the first part of the strict scrutiny
test is to identify whether a burden has been placed on the free exercise of religion); First United
Methodist, 129 Wash. 2d at 246, 916 P.2d at 378 (noting that the first part of the strict scrutiny test
is to identify whether a burden has been placed on the free exercise of religion); First Covenant, 120
Wash. 2d at 226, 840 P.2d at 187 (explaining that government action can be upheld if it does not
burden religious free exercise under the first prong of the strict scrutiny test).
104. Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 199, 930 P.2d at 321 (requiring that government infringement on
free exercise be justified by “a compelling state interest”); First United Methodist, 129 Wash. 2d. at
246, 916 P.2d at 378 (explaining that government restrictions on free exercise must “serve a
compelling state interest”); First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 226, 840 P.2d at 187 (“State action is
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government’s action is the least restrictive means of achieving its
compelling interest.105 Only if the government action advances a
compelling interest by the least restrictive means will a burden on
religious free exercise be upheld.
1.

The Government Action Must Be More than a “Slight
Inconvenience” to Burden Free Exercise

The Washington State Supreme Court begins its strict scrutiny
examination by determining whether the government action has
burdened the free exercise of religion.106 This first prong of the strict
scrutiny test requires the party alleging restraint of free exercise to
demonstrate “the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against
him in the practice of his religion.”107 As a preliminary matter, the
complaining party must demonstrate that its religious beliefs are
sincere.108 The religious activity need not be a “fundamental tenet” of
constitutional under the free exercise clause of article 1 if the action results in no infringement of a
citizen’s right or if a compelling state interest justifies any burden on the free exercise of religion.”
(citing Witters v. State Comm’n for the Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 371, 771 P.2d 1119, 1123 (1989);
City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church of Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 7–8, 639 P.2d 1358, 1362
(1982))).
105. Northshore United Church of Christ, 166 Wash. 2d at 642, 211 P.3d at 410 (explaining that
government must demonstrate that “it has a narrow means for achieving a compelling goal” (citing
Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark County, 140 Wash. 2d 143, 152, 995 P.2d 33, 39 (2000)));
Open Door Baptist, 140 Wash. 2d at 154, 995 P.2d at 39 (holding that the government’s action must
be “the least restrictive available to achieve the ends sought” (quoting Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d at 8,
639 P.2d at 1362)); Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 199, 930 P.2d at 321 (the government’s action must be
“the least restrictive means for achieving the government objective” (citing First United Methodist,
129 Wash. 2d at 246, 916 P.2d at 378)); First United Methodist, 129 Wash. 2d at 246, 916 P.2d at
378 (explaining that government action must be the “least restrictive means for achieving the
government objective”); First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 227, 840 P.2d at 187 (“The State also
must demonstrate that the means chosen to achieve its compelling interest are necessary and the
least restrictive available.” (citing Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d at 8, 15, 639 P.2d at 1366 (Utter, J.,
concurring); State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860, 864, 239 P.2d 545, 548
(1952))).
106. Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 199, 930 P.2d at 321 (noting that the first part of the strict scrutiny
test is to identify whether a burden has been placed on the free exercise of religion); First United
Methodist, 129 Wash. 2d. at 246, 916 P.2d at 378 (noting that the first part of the strict scrutiny test
is to identify whether a burden has been placed on the free exercise of religion); First Covenant, 120
Wash. 2d at 226, 840 P.2d at 187 (explaining that a government action can be upheld if it does not
burden religious free exercise under the first prong of the strict scrutiny test).
107. First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 218, 840 P.2d at 183 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963)).
108. Northshore United Church of Christ, 166 Wash. 2d at 642, 211 P.3d at 410 (explaining that
“a party challenging government action must show two things: that the belief is sincere and that the
government action burdens the exercise of religion.” (citing Open Door Baptist, 140 Wash. 2d at
152, 995 P.2d at 38)); see also Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 199, 930 P.2d at 321 (“The first prerequisite
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the complaining party’s religion for the religious activity to be
protected.109
The Washington State Supreme Court’s standard for determining
whether government action has a coercive effect on a party’s religious
beliefs is not clearly defined.110 The Court has concluded that a “slight
inconvenience” on free exercise is permissible, but a “substantial
burden” is not.111 Although the Court has not articulated the difference
between a slight inconvenience and an impermissible burden, it has
explained that its determination depends on “the context in which [the
government action] arises.”112
Even when evaluating government actions in similar contexts, the
Washington State Supreme Court has evaluated burdens on free exercise
differently. In three cases decided in the 1990s, the Court held that
forcing religious organizations to follow municipal land use application
procedures constituted an “administrative burden” that could be justified
only by a compelling government interest.113 In those cases, the Court
held that simply requiring a religious organization “to seek the approval
of a government body” established an impermissible burden on the free

for any free exercise challenge is that the parties have a sincere religious belief.”). Washington
courts have interpreted religious beliefs broadly. See In re Marriage of Jensen-Branch, 78 Wash.
App. 482, 490, 899 P.2d 803, 808 n.2 (1995) (noting that “religious beliefs” should be interpreted
broadly). The government is often willing to concede the sincerity of the complaining party’s
religious beliefs, including the concession that helping the homeless is a sincere religious belief. See
Northshore United Church of Christ, 166 Wash. 2d at 641, 211 P.3d at 410 (noting that the
government conceded the sincerity of the church’s religious belief in hosting a homeless
encampment).
109. See Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d at 7, 639 P.2d at 1362 (rejecting the argument that “because the
regulation here involved does not impact directly a fundamental tenet of the church, it does not
violate a member’s First Amendment rights.”); State v. Motherwell, 114 Wash. 2d 353, 361, 788
P.2d 1066, 1070 n.6 (1990) (explaining that in federal constitutional jurisprudence, “[t]he Supreme
Court has in some cases discussed the centrality of a claimant’s religious tenets, but it has never
expressly required claimants to establish centrality.”).
110. See Christopher W. Rosenbleeth, Note, Free Exercise of Religion—An Ordinance Requiring
a Church to Apply for a Conditional Use Permit Does Not Violate the Free Exercise Clause, 32
RUTGERS L.J. 1100, 1110 (2001) (explaining an “impermissible inconsistency” in the U.S. Supreme
Court’s burden analysis).
111. Northshore United Church of Christ, 166 Wash. 2d at 644, 211 P.3d at 411.
112. Id.
113. Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 195, 930 P.2d at 319 (holding that landmark ordinance created an
“administrative burden” that was not justified by a compelling interest); First United Methodist
Church of Seattle v. Hearing Exam’r for the Seattle Landmarks Pres. Bd., 129 Wash. 2d. 238, 251,
916 P.2d 374, 381 (1996) (noting that religious institutions cannot be restricted by “administrative”
burdens); First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 219, 840 P.2d 174,
183 (1992) (“The [historic preservation] ordinances burden free exercise ‘administratively’ because
they require that First Covenant seek the approval of a government body.”).
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exercise of religion.114 By 2000, however, the Court held that land use
application procedures did not burden free exercise.115 Unlike its earlier
determination of “administrative burdens,” the Court characterized the
impact of land use application procedures as “little more than the
inconvenience of filling out paperwork.”116 Commentators have
criticized this inconsistency in the Court’s burden analysis,117 and the
Court itself has had difficulty reconciling its burden determinations
following these decisions.118
Despite the inconsistent standard for determining whether a burden
has been placed on a party’s free exercise, the Washington State
Supreme Court usually recognizes a burden when the government action
has a financial impact on the complaining party.119 The Court has
maintained that “not all financial burdens” are onerous enough to impair
free exercise.120 “Gross financial burdens,” however, can be justified
only by a compelling government interest.121 “Gross financial burdens”
have never been clearly defined, but the Court has recognized a burden
on free exercise when government action has reduced the value of

114. First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 219, 840 P.2d at 183 (“The [historic preservation]
ordinances burden free exercise ‘administratively’ because they require that First Covenant seek the
approval of a government body.”).
115. Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark Cnty., 140 Wash. 2d 143, 166, 995 P.2d 33, 46 (2000)
(holding that application requirements for a zoning permit did not cause “anything more than an
incidental burden upon the free exercise of religion”).
116. Id. at 160, 995 P.2d at 43.
117. See Rosenbleeth, supra note 110; see also Beth Prieve, Comment, Religious Land Use
Jurisprudence: The Negative Ramifications for Religious Activities in Washington After Open Door
Baptist Church v. Clark County, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 365, 388 (2002) (“The Washington
Supreme Court displayed a far less protective treatment of church organizations than previously
reflected in other decisions.”).
118. See City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 166 Wash. 2d 633, 642,
644, 211 P.3d 406, 410, 411 (2009) (offering the ambiguous explanation that “a burden can be a
slight inconvenience without violating article I, section 11, but the State cannot impose a substantial
burden on exercise of religion.”).
119. See Open Door Baptist, 140 Wash. 2d at 160, 995 P.2d at 42–43 (discussing in dicta that an
application fee could be a financial burden on a religious organization); First United Methodist
Church of Seattle v. Hearing Exam’r for the Seattle Landmarks Pres. Bd., 129 Wash. 2d. 238, 251–
52, 916 P.2d 374, 381 (1996) (holding that ordinance prohibiting church from selling its property to
generate revenue placed a financial burden on religious free exercise); First Covenant, 120 Wash.
2d at 219, 840 P.2d at 183 (explaining that the landmark ordinance in question burdened the church
financially).
120. First United Methodist, 129 Wash. 2d. at 249, 916 P.2d at 380 (“While not all financial
burdens have a coercive effect on the practice of religion, gross financial burdens violate the right to
free exercise.” (citing First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 219, 840 P.2d at 183)).
121. Id.
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church property.122 The Court has also suggested the possibility that a
$5,523 application fee would place a financial burden on a religious
organization.123
Washington courts have recognized burdens on free exercise when
the government has required parties to take action prohibited by their
religious beliefs, even if the action appears minimally invasive and
reasonable. Washington courts have recognized burdens on free exercise
resulting from government-mandated paternity testing,124 tuberculosis
screening,125 flag saluting,126 driver licensing,127 and malpractice
insurance.128 Washington courts have also recognized burdens on free
exercise when the government has prevented citizens and religious
organizations from participating in activities required by their religious
beliefs, such as restrictions against marijuana use,129 and housing the
homeless.130

122. First United Methodist, 129 Wash. 2d. at 251–52, 916 P.2d at 381 (holding that ordinance
prohibiting church from selling its property to generate revenue placed a financial burden on
religious free exercise); First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 219, 840 P.2d at 183 (explaining that the
landmark ordinance in question burdened the church financially by decreasing the church’s property
value by almost one half).
123. Open Door Baptist, 140 Wash. 2d at 160, 995 P.2d at 42–43 (discussing in dicta that an
application fee could be a financial burden on a religious organization).
124. State v. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 735, 740, 612 P.2d 795, 798 (1980) (discussing the fact that
the government may only “restrict an individual’s exercise of conduct under a religious belief” as it
did with its blood testing regulation if such an action is justified by a compelling interest).
125. State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860, 863, 239 P.2d 545, 547–48 (1952)
(explaining that the plaintiff whose religious beliefs prohibited her from undergoing an x-ray as part
of a campus tuberculosis screening program had a right that was protected against infringement and
that the university’s board of regents infringed that right).
126. Bolling v. Super. Ct. for Clallam Cnty., 16 Wash. 2d 373, 387, 133 P.2d 803, 810 (1943)
(holding that a state law requiring school children to salute the flag placed a burden on the children
of Jehovah’s Witnesses).
127. State v. Clifford, 57 Wash. App. 127, 130, 132, 787 P.2d 571, 574 (1990) (finding that
statute requiring a party to obtain a driver’s license against his religious beliefs placed a burden on
free exercise).
128. Backlund v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 106 Wash. 2d 632, 641, 724 P.2d 981, 986 (1986) (finding
that rule requiring doctor to purchase malpractice insurance was protected belief that could only be
infringed by a compelling government interest).
129. State v. Balzer, 91 Wash. App. 44, 55, 954 P.2d 931, 937 (1998) (explaining that a
restriction on marijuana use burdens a party who believes marijuana use is part of his religion).
130. City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 166 Wash. 2d 633, 644, 211
P.3d 406, 411 (2009).
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Protecting Health and Safety Is the Only Government Interest
Compelling Enough to Justify a Burden on Free Exercise

If a government’s police power action burdens the free exercise of
religion, the government must demonstrate that its action serves a
“compelling state interest [that] justifies any burden on the free exercise
of religion.”131 The Court has described the compelling interest standard
in lofty terms, stating that an interest can be compelling only if it “has a
‘clear justification . . . in the necessities of national or community life’
that prevents a ‘clear and present, grave and immediate’ danger to public
health, peace, and welfare.”132 The Court has refused to find a
government interest compelling absent a “grave danger to the public
health, peace, or welfare.”133 Even when government regulations
“further cultural and esthetic interests,” the Court will not uphold the
regulations unless they “protect public health or safety.”134
Commentators have identified protection of health and safety as the
crucial component of compelling government interests.135
Contrary to its treatment of measures protecting health and safety, the
Washington State Supreme Court has refused to recognize a compelling
interest in government regulation of outdoor aesthetics and historic
preservation of buildings. The Court applied its compelling interest
standard in three cases in which religious organizations were burdened
by aesthetically motivated historic preservation ordinances.136 In each
case, the Court held that the preservation ordinances failed to qualify as
131. First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 226, 840 P.2d 174,
187 (1992) (citing Witters v. State Comm’n for the Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 371, 771 P.2d 1119,
1123 (1989); City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church of Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 7–8, 639 P.2d 1358,
1362 (1982)).
132. First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 226–27, 840 P.2d at 187 (quoting Bolling v. Super. Ct. for
Clallam Cnty., 16 Wash. 2d 373, 385, 133 P.2d 803, 809 (1943); State ex rel. Holcomb v.
Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860, 864, 239 P.2d 545, 548 (1952)).
133. First Covenant, at 227, 840 P.2d at 188 (citing State ex rel. Holcomb, 39 Wash. 2d at 864,
239 P.2d at 548).
134. Id. at 222, 840 P.2d at 185.
135. Katie Hosford, Comment, The Search for a Distinct Religious-Liberty Jurisprudence Under
the Washington State Constitution, 75 WASH. L. REV. 643, 658 (demonstrating that, in the absence
of well-developed Washington State Supreme Court case law, the Washington State Court of
Appeals has limited compelling interests to only those that protect peace and safety (citing State v.
Norman, 61 Wash. App. 16, 808 P.2d 1159 (1991); State v. Balzer, 91 Wash. App. 44, 954 P.2d 931
(1998))).
136. Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 195, 930 P.2d 318, 319 (1997) (landmark ordinance);
First United Methodist Church of Seattle v. Hearing Exam’r for the Seattle Landmarks Pres. Bd.,
129 Wash.2d. 238, 251, 916 P.2d 374, 381 (1996) (historic preservation ordinance); First Covenant,
120 Wash. 2d at 219, 840 P.2d at 183 (historic preservation ordinance).
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compelling interests justifying their burden on free exercise.137 The fatal
flaw in each case was the failure of the aesthetic ordinances to “protect
public health or safety.”138
3.

The Government Action Will Fail If Less Restrictive Measures
Could Achieve the Compelling Interest

If the government establishes that its burden on religious free exercise
is justified by a compelling interest, it still has one final hurdle to clear:
The government must show that its action is the least restrictive means
of achieving its compelling interest.139 To determine whether the
government has met this least restrictive requirement, the Washington
State Supreme Court inquires “whether there are less restrictive
alternatives . . . still fulfilling the legitimate governmental
interests . . . . ”140 The Court will “‘searchingly examine’ the asserted
137. Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 195, 930 P.2d at 319 (landmark ordinance); First United Methodist,
129 Wash.2d. at 251, 916 P.2d at 381 (historic preservation ordinance); First Covenant, 120 Wash.
2d at 219, 840 P.2d at 183 (historic preservation ordinance).
138. Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 201, 930 P.2d at 322 (holding that historic preservation ordinances
“do not protect public health or safety”); First United Methodist, 129 Wash. 2d at 250, 916 P.2d at
380 n.6 (explaining that landmark ordinances might further aesthetic and historical interests but are
not compelling (citing First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 223, 840 P.2d at 185)); First Covenant, 120
Wash. 2d at 222, 840 P.2d at 185 (holding that despite cultural and aesthetic interests protected by
historic preservation ordinances, those ordinances do not further compelling interests because they
“do not protect public health or safety”).
139. City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 166 Wash. 2d 633, 642, 211
P.3d 406, 410 (2009) (requiring the government to demonstrate that “it has a narrow means for
achieving a compelling goal” (citing Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark Cnty., 140 Wash. 2d 143,
152, 995 P.2d 33, 39 (2000))); Open Door Baptist, 140 Wash. 2d at 154, 995 P.2d at 39 (holding
that the government’s action must be “the least restrictive available to achieve the ends sought”
(quoting Sumner v. First Baptist Church of Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 8, 639 P.2d 1358, 1362
(1982))); Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 199, 930 P.2d at 321 (requiring that the government’s action be
“the least restrictive means for achieving the government objective”); First United Methodist, 129
Wash. 2d at 246, 916 P.2d at 378 (explaining that government action must be the “least restrictive
means for achieving the government objective”); First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 227, 840 P.2d at
187 (“The State must also demonstrate that the means chosen to achieve its compelling interest are
necessary and the least restrictive available.” (citing Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d at 8, 15, 639 P.2d at 1366
(Utter, J., concurring))).
140. Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d at 10, 639 P.2d at 1363–64; see also Open Door Baptist, 140 Wash. 2d
at 166–67, 995 P.2d at 46 (observing, in dicta, that the government had “no less restrictive
alternative to requiring” a church to apply for a zoning exemption without completely exempting
churches from zoning requirements); State v. Motherwell, 114 Wash. 2d 353, 366, 788 P.2d 1066,
1073 (1990) (holding that child abuse reporting statute was the least restrictive means of
accomplishing government’s interest in protecting children from abuse because protecting children
from abuse could not be “accomplished in a less inhibitory manner… while still allowing the state
to satisfy its interests”); State v. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 735, 740, 612 P.2d 795, 798 (1980) (“If the
statute’s purpose may be achieved by measures less drastic than restriction of First Amendment
rights, the state must utilize such other measures.” (citing State v. Loetze, 92 Wash. 2d 52, 58–59,
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interest of the [government], and should consider the effect of allowing
specific exceptions or deviations” to accommodate free exercise.141
When government regulation and religious free exercise conflict, the
government must approach such conflicts “with flexibility,” striving
toward “accommodation between the competing interests.”142 Rigid
enforcement of government regulations demonstrates that the least
restrictive means have not been employed.143 The government action
must also be a “narrow” approach to achieving its interest144 and must
share a nexus of necessity with the interest.145
B.

The Court’s Only Decision Affecting Homeless Encampments on
Church Property Provides Little Guidance on the Valid Reach of
the Police Power

In City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ,146 the
Washington State Supreme Court applied its strict scrutiny test for the
first time to a government action that affected a homeless encampment
on church property.147 In 2004, the Northshore United Church of Christ
entered into a consent agreement with the City of Woodinville,
Washington regarding temporary homeless encampments.148 The
contract prohibited the church from hosting any homeless encampment
“without a valid temporary use permit.”149 After signing the agreement,
593 P.2d 811, 814 (1979))).
141. Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d at 10, 639 P.2d at 1363 (internal citation omitted) (citing Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)).
142. Sumner, at 9–10, 639 P.2d at 1363–64.
143. See id. at 9–10, 639 P.2d at 1363 (“An effort to accommodate the religious freedom of
appellants while at the same time giving effect to the legitimate concerns of the City . . . would
seem to be in order.”).
144. See Northshore United Church of Christ, 166 Wash. 2d at 645, 211 P.3d at 411 (holding that
a blanket restriction on all conditional use permits was not a “narrow means for achieving a
compelling goal”).
145. See Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d at 740–41, 612 P.2d at 798 (holding that the state’s compelling
interest in collecting child support from fathers had a nexus of necessity with a blood-drawing
requirement in paternity tests); see also Backlund v. Bd. of Comm’rs of King Cnty. Hosp. Dist. 2,
106 Wash. 2d 632, 646–47, 724 P.2d 981, 989 (1986) (holding that a public hospital’s requirement
that doctors carry malpractice insurance had a nexus of necessity with the compelling interest of
providing adequate funds for patients who successfully litigate malpractice claims against the
doctor).
146. 166 Wash. 2d 633, 211 P.3d 406 (2009).
147. Id. at 637, 211 P.3d at 407–08.
148. Id. at 638, 211 P.3d at 408 (“The City, Share/Wheel, and the Church executed a contract
spelling out conditions for the temporary use and the parties’ rights and duties.”).
149. Id.
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the city adopted a moratorium on all temporary use permits.150 While the
moratorium was still in place, the church applied for a permit to host a
homeless encampment.151 The city rejected the application because of its
moratorium.152 The church proceeded to host the encampment without
the permit and the city filed for a temporary restraining order.153 The
trial court enjoined the church from hosting the encampment and the
Washington Court of Appeals affirmed on federal constitutional and
statutory grounds.154 The church appealed the decision to the
Washington State Supreme Court,155 and the Court addressed whether
the city’s refusal to consider the church’s application violated the state
constitution’s protection of free exercise.156
Under the first prong of the strict scrutiny test, the Court analyzed
whether the city’s actions placed a burden on the church.157 The Court
reasoned that a burden on free exercise “must be evaluated in the context
in which it arises.”158 The Court analyzed the homeless encampment
context, finding that “[h]ousing the homeless affects those outside the
church in a way that private prayer or religious services inside the
church buildings do not.”159 The Court reasoned that “[c]ities may
mediate these externalities reflecting concerns for safety, noise, and
crime” based on the police power of the state and the limits placed on
free exercise in the state constitution.160 Nevertheless, the Court held that
a city “may not outright deny consideration of permitting.”161 The city’s
complete refusal to consider a church’s application to host the homeless
encampment thus “placed a substantial burden on the Church.”162

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. (“The City refused to process the application, citing the moratorium on all
permits . . . .”).
153. Id. at 639, 211 P.2d at 408.
154. City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 139 Wash. App. 639, 654, 162
P.3d 427, 434 (2007).
155. City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 162 Wash. 2d 1019, 178 P.3d
1033 (2008) (granting review).
156. Northshore United Church of Christ, 166 Wash. 2d at 640, 211 P.3d at 409.
157. Id. at 642, 211 P.3d at 410 (“[A] party challenging government action must show . . . that the
government action burdens the exercise of religion.”).
158. Id. at 644, 211 P.3d at 411.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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The Court only briefly discussed whether the city’s moratorium
served a compelling interest. 163 Because the city failed to brief the
matter, the Court summarily determined that no compelling interest was
present.164 While the Court noted that municipal police power still
provides a valid check on religious free exercise,165 it provided little
guidance as to the valid reach of municipal regulation of homeless
encampments.
III. WHILE MANY HOMELESS ENCAMPMENT REGULATIONS
ARE VALID POLICE POWER ACTIONS, SOME FAIL THE
STRICT SCRUTINY TEST
Even though municipal governments may regulate a broad range of
activities under their constitutionally protected police power,166 police
power actions affecting the free exercise of religion are still subject to
the Washington State Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny test.167 Such is the
case when municipalities regulate homeless encampments hosted by
religious organizations. The strict scrutiny test requires that homeless
encampment regulations burdening religious exercise be justified by a
compelling government interest.168 The homeless encampment
regulations must also be the least restrictive means of achieving the
government’s goal.169
163. Id. at 642, 211 P.3d at 410 (discussing that the city had not briefed whether its actions served
a compelling interest and that “the only issue presented is whether the city’s actions substantially
burden the free exercise” of the church).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 642, 211 P.3d at 410 n.3 (explaining that “[o]f course, the government may require
compliance with reasonable police power regulation”).
166. See Spitzer, supra note 8.
167. See, e.g., First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 218, 840
P.2d 174, 183 (1992) (stating that the Washington State Supreme Court will subject any
infringement on free exercise to strict scrutiny); see also supra text accompanying notes 102–105
(explaining the Washington State Supreme Court’s reliance on the strict scrutiny test).
168. See, e.g., First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 226, 840 P.2d at 187 (“State action is
constitutional under the free exercise clause of article 1 if the action results in no infringement of a
citizen’s right or if a compelling state interest justifies any burden on the free exercise of religion.”
(citing Witters v. State Comm’n for the Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 371, 771 P.2d 1119, 1122–23
(1989); City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church of Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 7–8, 639 P.2d 1358, 1362
(1982))); see also supra text accompanying notes 131–138 (explaining the Washington State
Supreme Court’s burden analysis).
169. First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 227, 840 P.2d at 187 (“The State also must demonstrate
that the means chosen to achieve its compelling interest are necessary and the least restrictive
available.” (citing Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d at 14–15, 639 P.2d at 1366 (Utter, J., concurring))); see
also supra text accompanying notes 139–145 (describing the Washington State Supreme Court’s
least restrictive means requirement).
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Municipal Homeless Encampment Regulations Create a Burden on
Religious Free Exercise that Must Be Justified by a Compelling
Government Interest

Under the first prong of the strict scrutiny test, Washington courts
decide whether a government action burdens the free exercise of
religion.170 Although the Washington State Supreme Court has never
established a clear burden formula, Washington courts generally
recognize a burden on free exercise if the government action causes a
party to incur substantial financial expense,171 compels a party to act
counter to its religious beliefs,172 or prevents a party from engaging in
acts required by the party’s religion.173 Under this reasoning, homeless
encampment regulations burden free exercise when applied to religious
organizations.
The Washington State Supreme Court has held sanitation, sewage,
clean water, and security regulations to be constitutionally protected
exercises of municipal police power when applied to secular actors.174
As applied to religious institutions, however, these regulations create a
burden on free exercise that must be justified by a compelling
government interest. Requiring a church to pay for additional sanitation,
sewage, and drinking water service for temporary residents affects the
organization financially. Fire safety provisions also have a financial
impact by forcing a religious organization to shoulder the cost of flameretardant tents and outdoor electrical equipment. The same is true for
weapons bans and security patrols, which could require the retention of a
private security firm. Visual screening regulations also add costs to the
protected activity of housing the homeless. These regulations and other
fees associated with hosting a homeless encampment175 are a significant

170. See, e.g., First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 226, 840 P.2d at 187 (explaining that government
action can be upheld if it does not burden religious free exercise under the first prong of the strict
scrutiny test).
171. See, e.g., Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark Cnty., 140 Wash. 2d at 160, 995 P.2d at 42–43
(discussing in dicta that an application fee could be a financial burden on a religious organization);
see also supra text accompanying notes 119–123 (explaining financial burdens on religious free
exercise).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 124–128.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 129–130.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 24–28.
175. Anne Kim, Tent City Hit With $4,000 Bill, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 9, 2006, at B3 (explaining
that First Evangelical Lutheran Church, a homeless encampment host site, had been billed for the
hours that Bothell city officials spent processing its application).
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financial burden analogous to the burdens described in previous
Washington cases.176
The regulations would also burden religious organizations
“administratively”177 because they require religious institutions to follow
secular standards when engaging in protected religious activity.
Providing sewage, clean water, trash cleanup, and security support is
much more burdensome than the mere “inconvenience of filling out
paperwork.”178 It requires a concentrated financial and administrative
effort to comply with municipal standards for assisting the homeless.
A prohibition against hosting sex offender residents would also
burden religious exercise. While many religious organizations do not
want sex offenders living in their homeless encampments,179 other
religious organizations could argue that helping all homeless persons is
part of their religious practice, regardless of a resident’s criminal history.
Prohibiting such religious organizations from hosting homeless sex
offenders prevents them from engaging in protected religious acts. This
prohibition places a burden on free exercise analogous to burdens
recognized in other Washington cases where government action has kept
a party from participating in sincerely held religious activity.180
Similarly, uniform limitations on the number of residents a church
may host at its encampment and blanket restrictions on the duration an
encampment may stay at a particular site both burden the free exercise of
religion. When an organization has a religious mandate to provide
housing for the homeless, capping the number of homeless persons the
organization may serve directly limits its protected religious practice.
Likewise, limiting the duration of a particular homeless encampment

176. Open Door Baptist Church, 140 Wash. 2d at 160, 995 P.2d at 42–43 (discussing in dicta that
an application fee could be a financial burden on a religious organization); First United Methodist
Church of Seattle v. Hearing Exam’r for the Seattle Landmarks Pres. Bd., 129 Wash. 2d. 238, 251–
52, 916 P.2d, 374, 381 (1996) (holding that ordinance prohibiting church from selling its property to
generate revenue placed a financial burden on religious free exercise); First Covenant Church of
Seattle v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 219, 840 P.2d, 174, 183 (1992) (explaining that the
landmark ordinance in question burdened the church financially).
177. First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 219, 840 P.2d at 183 (“The [historic preservation]
ordinances burden free exercise ‘administratively’ because they require that First Covenant seek the
approval of a government body . . . .”).
178. Open Door Baptist Church, 140 Wash. 2d at 160, 995 P.2d at 43.
179. Tent City 3 Frequently Asked Questions, MAPLE LEAF LUTHERAN CHURCH, http://
peaceoutchurch.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=77&Itemid=228 (last
visited Sept. 13, 2010) (explaining that homeless encampment residents “do not want sex offenders
living in their tent community”).
180. See, e.g., State v. Balzer, 91 Wash. App. 44, 55, 954 P.2d 931, 937 (1998) (recognizing that
laws criminalizing marijuana possession placed a burden on the defendant’s free exercise).

1130_Talge_Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

2010]

12/5/2010 7:30 PM

NO DIRECTION HOME

807

shortens the period a religious organization can serve the homeless. The
two related restrictions prohibit a religious organization from
participating in protected religious exercise. The limits must therefore be
justified by a compelling government interest.
B.

Sewage, Sanitation, Fire Safety, and Security Regulations Protect
Public Health and Safety, but Aesthetic Screening Regulations Do
Not

Even when a government action burdens free exercise, it may still be
valid if it serves a compelling interest.181 Despite the burden that all
municipal homeless encampment regulations place on religious
organization hosts, sewage, clean water, sanitation, and security
measures all serve a compelling government interest in public health and
safety. Conversely, visual screening requirements serve aesthetic
interests alone and do not further a compelling health and safety interest.
Homeless encampment ordinances requiring sanitation, sewage,
drinking water, and security measures all serve a compelling government
interest. The Washington State Supreme Court has repeatedly found a
direct public health justification in municipal ordinances dealing with
sewage,182 clean water,183 and waste disposal.184 The importance of
sanitation, sewage, and clean water ordinances to public health
outweighs the burden they place on free exercise. Likewise, fire safety
provisions would meet the second prong of the strict scrutiny test by
protecting the community from fire danger, an interest that has long been
held to fall within the municipal police power.185 Practices posing a fire
hazard are also limited by article I, section 11, which bans religious
activities jeopardizing public safety.186
A compelling government interest also justifies the burden a ban on
weapons in homeless encampments places on a religious organization
181. See, e.g., First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 226, 840 P.2d at 187 (“State action is
constitutional under the free exercise clause of article 1 if the action results in no infringement of a
citizen’s right or if a compelling state interest justifies any burden on the free exercise of religion.”
(citing Witters v. State Comm’n for the Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 371, 771 P.2d 1119, 1122–23
(1989); City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church of Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 7–8, 639 P.2d 1358, 1362
(1982))).
182. Elliott v. City of Leavenworth, 197 Wash. 427, 431, 85 P.2d 1053, 1054–55 (1938).
183. Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 Wash. 2d 616, 620, 277 P.2d 352, 354 (1954).
184. City of Spokane v. Carlson, 73 Wash. 2d 76, 80, 436 P.2d 454, 457 (1968); Cornelius v. City
of Seattle. 123 Wash. 550, 556–57, 213 P. 17, 19 (1923).
185. Coffin v. Blackwell, 116 Wash. 281, 287, 199 P. 239, 241–42 (1921); City of Seattle v.
Hinckley, 40 Wash. 468, 471, 82 P. 747, 748 (1905).
186. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.

1130_Talge_Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

12/5/2010 7:30 PM

808

[Vol. 85:781

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

host. In its limited discussion of the valid reach of homeless
encampment regulations, the Washington State Supreme Court
explained in Northshore United Church of Christ that large numbers of
outdoor residents could create “externalities” such as crime that would
require government action.187 Eliminating weapons from the area would
mitigate this externality by protecting the safety of encampment
residents and the surrounding neighborhood. The Court has already
recognized weapons restrictions as valid restrictions on the
constitutionally protected right to bear arms.188 For the same reasons, the
positive impact of weapons restrictions on safety makes such regulations
compelling enough to survive the second prong of the strict scrutiny test.
Like challenges to weapons bans, challenges to sex offender
residency restrictions are likely justified by a compelling interest. The
Washington legislature has already recognized an interest in sex
offender residency restrictions to prevent crime and protect public
safety.189 Although this statute’s constitutionality has not been evaluated
by the Washington State Supreme Court, the Court has long recognized
child protection as a compelling government interest,190 a conclusion
that courts in other jurisdictions have reached in upholding sex offender
residency restrictions.191

187. City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 166 Wash. 2d 633, 644, 211
P.3d 406, 411 (2009).
188. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Montana, 129 Wash. 2d 583, 592, 919 P.2d 1218, 1223 (1996).
189. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.703 (2008) (prohibiting individuals convicted of child sex
crimes from living within “community protection zones”).
190. Although the Washington State Supreme Court has not ruled on the validity of sex offender
residency restrictions, it has recognized a compelling interest in state protection of children in other
contexts. See State v. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 735, 738, 612 P.2d 795, 797 (1980) (upholding
paternity test law because “the interest of the State in the welfare of its minor children has long been
a compelling and paramount concern.” (citing Heney v. Heney, 24 Wash. 2d 445, 165 P.2d 864
(1946); State v. Coffey, 77 Wash. 2d 630, 465 P.2d 665 (1970); State v. Bowen, 80 Wash. 2d 808,
498 P.2d 877 (1972); State v. Wood, 89 Wash. 2d 97, 569 P.2d 1148 (1977))); see also State v.
Motherwell, 114 Wash. 2d 353, 365, 788 P.2d 1066, 1072 (1990) (upholding child abuse reporting
statute because “the State’s interest in the protection of children is unquestionably of the utmost
importance.”).
191. See Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep’t, 453 F.3d 1010, 1016–20, (8th Cir. 2006) (holding
that Arkansas law barring sex offenders from living near schools was not an unconstitutional ex post
facto law, did not violate substantive due process, did not violate equal protection, and did not
violate constitutional right to intrastate travel); Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 708–22 (8th Cir. 2005)
(holding that Iowa law preventing sex offenders from living within 2000 feet of a school did not
violate substantive or procedural due process, did not abridge any constitutional right to travel, did
not violate the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination, and was not an ex post
facto law); Doe v. Baker, No. Civ.A. 1:05-CV-2265, 2006 WL 905368, *2–9 (N.D. Ga. April 5,
2006) (holding that Georgia state law prohibiting sex offenders from living within 1000 feet of
school or child care facility was not an ex post facto law, did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s
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Unlike the health and safety measures discussed above, aesthetic
screening regulations do not further a compelling government interest.
Even as applied to secular organizations, aesthetic screening
requirements have been justified only on the basis of limiting criminal
activity192 or protecting public safety,193 thereby coupling their aesthetic
purpose with a larger government interest in public health and safety.
The purpose of the homeless encampment screening requirements is
simply to lessen the visual impact of the encampment,194 thus protecting
aesthetic interests alone. The screening requirements do not attempt to
cure a direct threat to public safety, in contrast to the valid ordinances
upheld in Markham195 and Lenci.196 More importantly, the Washington
State Supreme Court has previously held that the government’s interest
in outdoor aesthetics is not compelling enough to justify a burden on
religious free exercise.197 Aesthetic interests are not compelling because
they do not protect “public health and safety.”198 The aesthetic screening
requirements in Washington’s municipal homeless encampment
ordinances fail the strict scrutiny test.
Just as visual screening regulations require a link to the protection of
public health and safety, maximum-resident and maximum-duration
restrictions must show a connection to health and safety to justify their
burden on free exercise. Homeless encampment ordinances include these
resident and duration restrictions but do not include an explanation of

prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, did not violate substantive or procedural due process,
and did not result in a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment); People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769,
776–77 (Ill. App. 2005) (holding that Illinois statute prohibiting sex offenders from living within
500 feet of schools was reasonably related to the government’s compelling interest in protecting
children from sex offenders).
192. Lenci v. City of Seattle, 63 Wash. 2d 664, 676–77, 388 P.2d 926, 934 (1964).
193. Markham Adver. Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 421, 439 P.2d 248, 258 (1968).
194. See supra text accompanying note 79 (describing the purpose of aesthetic screening
requirements in homeless encampment ordinances).
195. Markham, 73 Wash. 2d at 421, 439 P.2d at 258.
196. Lenci, 63 Wash. 2d at 676–77, 388 P.2d at 934.
197. Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 195, 930 P.2d 318, 319 (1997) (landmark ordinance);
First United Methodist Church of Seattle v. Hearing Exam’r for the Seattle Landmarks Pres. Bd.,
129 Wash. 2d. 238, 251, 916 P.2d 374, 381 (1996); First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of
Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 219, 840 P.2d 174, 183 (1992); see also supra text accompanying notes
136–138 (explaining the Washington State Supreme Court’s treatment of historic preservation
ordinances as applied to religious organizations).
198. First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 222, 840 P.2d at 185 (holding that despite cultural and
aesthetic interests protected by historic preservation ordinances, those ordinances cannot be
compelling interests because they “do not protect public health or safety”).
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the compelling interest such restrictions aim to achieve.199 While a
health and safety purpose is clear from the face of homeless
encampment provisions regulating sewage, clean water, sanitation, fire
safety, sex offender residency, and weapons, a health and safety
justification is more attenuated in uniform maximum-resident and
maximum-duration restrictions. Specific findings explaining the
relationship between these provisions and the protection of health and
safety are necessary to prove their compelling government interest.200
Possible findings could include a study linking resident density to health
and safety. By defining a “safe” number of residents per unit of land,
municipalities could show a compelling interest in limiting the number
of residents in a given location. Likewise, pairing health and safety with
specific homeless encampment durations would clarify the compelling
interest that duration limitations are designed to achieve. While a
sympathetic court might find a compelling interest in these blanket
limitations as they are currently written, specific findings relating to
health and safety are necessary to justify resident and duration
limitations as compelling government interests.
C.

While Sewage, Sanitation, Fire Safety, and Security Regulations
Are Sufficiently Narrow, One-Size-Fits-All Resident and Duration
Restrictions Are Not

Even if a government burden on free exercise is justified by a
compelling interest, the government action must still be the least
restrictive means of achieving that interest.201 Washington courts must
“searchingly examine” the government’s effect on religious free exercise
to determine if a less restrictive measure, or an exception or deviation
from the government regulation, could accommodate religious free
exercise while still furthering the government’s compelling interest.202

199. See supra text accompanying notes 93–96 (describing maximum-resident and maximumduration restrictions).
200. See, e.g., Ackerly Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 92 Wash. 2d 905, 920, 602 P.2d 1177,
1186–87 (1979) (validating government police power action because of findings that measure
would protect health and safety).
201. First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 227, 840 P.2d at 187 (“The State also must demonstrate
that the means chosen to achieve its compelling interest are necessary and the least restrictive
available.” (citing City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church of Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 8, 15, 639 P.2d
1358, 1366 (1982) (Utter, J., concurring))); see also supra text accompanying notes 139–145
(explaining the Washington State Supreme Court’s least restrictive means requirement).
202. Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d at 10, 639 P.2d at 1363–64 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
221 (1972)).
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The government’s chosen regulation must be a “narrow means”203
selected in an overall effort toward accommodation.204
Sewage, clean water, sanitation, and security provisions in homeless
encampment ordinances are all narrowly tailored to a single externality
that outdoor homeless encampments present. It is difficult to imagine
less inhibitory measures that would still achieve the government’s health
and safety goals. To protect against illness and disease, homeless
encampment regulations require portable toilets, clean water, and trash
collection. To protect the safety of residents and the surrounding
neighborhood, homeless encampment regulations require reasonable fire
prevention steps, prohibit sex offenders, and ban weapons. These
provisions are narrowly tailored to the specific government interest they
aim to achieve. Although the provisions burden the free exercise of
religious organization hosts, they are narrow enough to demonstrate an
effort at accommodation while still achieving their compelling
government interest. Because of their narrow scope and their close nexus
with the government interest they aim to promote, sewage, clean water,
sanitation, and security measures are the least restrictive means of
accomplishing compelling government interests in health and safety and
are therefore constitutional.
Unlike the narrow health and safety regulations discussed above,
uniform restrictions on the number of residents homeless encampments
may host are not the least restrictive means of achieving their purported
interest. Similarly, blanket limitations on the amount of time a religious
organization may host a homeless encampment are not the least
restrictive means of achieving a government goal. Homeless
encampment regulations in Washington place a one-size-fits-all
restriction on encampment residents at only 100 persons, irrespective of
the size, location, or capacity of an encampment’s host.205 Likewise,
most homeless encampment regulations sharply limit all encampments
to only ninety days at a particular site and flatly prohibit an organization
from hosting a second encampment until two years after hosting its
first.206 By rigidly enforcing these uniform restrictions on churches of
varying size and capacity, municipalities fail to consider “exceptions or

203. City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 166 Wash. 2d 633, 642, 211
P.3d 406, 410 (2009).
204. Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d at 10, 639 P.2d at 1363–64.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 93–97 (describing maximum-resident and maximumduration restrictions).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 93–97.
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deviations”207 that would be less restrictive to the protected religious
activity of ministering to the homeless. If the resident and duration
restrictions are aimed at protecting health and safety, less restrictive
health and safety measures are already included in homeless
encampment ordinances.208 When less restrictive means not only exist
but have already been enacted by the municipality, uniform caps on
residents and duration cannot be the least restrictive means of protecting
health and safety.
Maximum-resident and maximum-duration restrictions also fail
because they are not “narrow”209 means connected by a “nexus of
necessity”210 to the interest they purport to advance. Resident and
duration restrictions lack findings establishing a government interest in
health and safety.211 Without such findings, uniform caps at 100
residents and blanket limitations of ninety days at all host sites become
arbitrary figures lacking the health and safety nexus required by the
strict scrutiny test. To qualify as a narrow means, maximum-resident
restrictions must establish a public health or safety interest in a specific
resident density, perhaps through legislative findings defining the safe
number of residents per unit of land. This “safe” density could then be
applied individually to homeless encampment hosts to determine a
maximum resident capacity for that specific host site. By applying this
tailored density formula to specific hosts, municipalities would provide a
much narrower restriction on free exercise than current one-size-fits-all
limitations. Applying a “safe” density formula would also demonstrate a
nexus with the government’s interest in health and safety. Only through
narrow tailoring, such as a density formula, could maximum-resident
restrictions satisfy the third prong of the strict scrutiny test. As currently
written, such restrictions are unconstitutional infringements on free
exercise.
Similarly, municipalities must link their ninety-day limitations on
homeless encampments to the protection of health and safety. The
government’s interest in homeless encampments being “temporary” is

207. Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d at 10, 639 P.2d at 1363–64.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 33–35, 53–55 (outlining the health and safety regulations
included in municipal homeless encampment ordinances).
209. City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 166 Wash. 2d 633, 642, 211
P.3d 406, 410 (2009).
210. State v. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 735, 740, 612 P.2d 795, 798 (1980).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 93–96; see also supra Part III.B (explaining that
homeless encampment ordinances do not include findings that link maximum-resident restrictions to
public safety).
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not enough. Municipalities must demonstrate a “nexus of necessity”
between the duration an encampment stays at a given site and the
protection of public health and safety.212 Until municipalities establish
this nexus and tailor restrictions to specific hosts, blanket limitations on
encampment duration will fail to satisfy the third prong of the strict
scrutiny test.
CONCLUSION
The Washington State Constitution provides “absolute” protection for
religious free exercise. It also vests strong police power in municipal
governments. Homeless encampment regulations stand at the threshold
between these two competing constitutional provisions. To distinguish
valid police power actions from undue restrictions on free exercise, the
Washington State Supreme Court has articulated a three-pronged strict
scrutiny test. Under the first prong of the strict scrutiny test, all homeless
encampment regulations burden the free exercise of religion. Under the
second prong, however, many of these burdens are justified by a
compelling government interest in public health and safety. Provisions
regulating sewage, clean water, sanitation, fire safety, weapons
possession, and sex offender residency all protect public health and
safety; whereas aesthetic screening requirements do not. Finally, under
the third prong of the strict scrutiny test, blanket restrictions on
encampment population size and duration are not the least restrictive
means of accomplishing a compelling government interest.
Municipalities and religious organizations should consider these
constitutional limitations on Washington’s homeless encampment
ordinances in the years ahead.

212. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d at 740, 612 P.2d at 798 (1980).

